THE SITUATION:
That report found that electronic intruders are attacking data networks at increasing rates, and have compromised elements of the telephone signaling network. A senior DISA official has bluntly stated that "We are not prepared for an electronic version of Pearl Harbor" and that "Our electronic infrastructure is not safe and secure." In 1999 DISA tested the security of DoD information systems by attacking nearly 10,000 systems using widely available techniques. They successfully penetrated 88 percent, of which only 4 percent were even detected. VADM John M. McConnell, Director of the National Security Agency, emphasizing the asymmetry in our national risk, has said that "We're more vulnerable than any other nation on earth." External threats are real: intelligence data indicate that at least 30 countries are actively working on information warfare programs.
Outside of DoD the situation is no different. The telephone system, the banking, credit, and Federal Reserve systems, the stock exchanges, the power and fuels distribution systems, the air traffic control and other intelligent transportation systems, the federal elections system, public safety and law enforcement all depend heavily on networked information systems which are potentially vulnerable to networked-based attacks. Most observers agree that business losses are notoriously under-reported, but one recent press estimate put U.S. losses within the past year from computer crimes via the Internet alone at $5 billion.
The national level and gravity of the problem are underlined by the Federal Government's extremely high (and increasing) degree of dependence on the NII to carry out critical governmental responsibilities, including national security, defense, law enforcement and public safety functions. No one knows the exact degree of this governmental dependence on the availability and integrity of the NII, but it is extremely high. Informed estimates suggest that 90 to 95 percent of the information needed to carry out essential Governmental functions must in some way be processed by information systems in the privately owned and operated parts of the existing NII.
Although there are many points at which these organizations intersect with each other, the big picture is one of fragmentation, duplication, and inefficiency. This shows up in at least four general areas.
(1) There's no single entity with sufficient breadth of vision, responsibility and resources to effectively manage the Executive Branch's efforts towards the goal of information infrastructure assurance. This was recently highlighted by the Rand Corporation's gaming exercise, "The Day After." It was clear to most participants of this exercise that a deadly information attack on America was feasible, and that, because of the government/private and nationally distributed nature of the "target," we had no one in charge, or even capable of pulling the necessary defensive efforts together. As stated by the Defense Science Board in a recent report: "There is no nationally coordinated capability to counter or even detect a structured threat."
(2) The Executive Branch currently has no effective organization or entity to act as a "Fair Court" in making security-related policy decisions which fairly balance - and are widely perceived to fairly balance the sometimes competing but legitimate interests of national security, law enforcement, commerce, and personal privacy in the national interest. Current areas of contention which require careful balance in the national interest include national encryption policy, export controls, and information system standards. As digital networking comes to dominate the information universe, however, there will be other complex policy and resource issues which will have to be decided on the basis of what's best for the nation as a whole, instead of which particular bureaucracy/constituency wins which particular policy battle. If the Government is to have the capability to find the best, balanced, solutions to these future challenges, it will need a technically competent, well-resourced and authoritative "Fair Court" within the Executive Branch.
(3) The Executive Branch currently has four overlapping NII security-related "movements" going on, and their inter-relationships and coordination are not clear. One "movement" tends to fall under the banner of "Information Assurance" and is led by the NCS/NSTAC. A second closely related "movement" is grouped around the diverse DoD-centered "Defensive Information Warfare" efforts. Although there are aspects of Defensive Information Warfare which fall outside the boundaries of information assurance/security activities (principally up-front I&W, and the defense against hard/physical attacks on critical network nodes) a great deal of "Defensive Information Warfare" is synonymous with traditional Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) activities and countermeasures. These INFOSEC activities and organizational elements constitute the third, and oldest, of the NII security-related "movements" within the Executive Branch, and are most developed in the Departments of Defense (particularly at NSA) and Commerce (particularly at NIST). The fourth and most recent such "movement" is made up of the diverse activities, committees and working groups, largely under the umbrella of the IITF, which are focused on "NII Protection and Privacy."
(4) The limited Federal Government resources to achieve Information Infrastructure Assurance appear to be inefficiently, ineffectively, and illogically scattered throughout the Executive Branch. One of the widely shared criticisms of the Computer Security Act of 1987 is that the law assigned substantial computer systems security responsibilities to the Department of Commerce, but provided virtually no resources to execute these responsibilities. This is, however, only one of the irrationalities which present themselves when the distribution of scarce information security and assurance resources across the Executive Branch are considered from a national perspective. Technical centers of excellence certainly exist, but it is doubtful that they are effectively and efficiently applied to the highest priority problems. Similarly, the resources being applied to Information Assurance Research and Development efforts do not appear to be considered or managed from a national perspective, with resulting likelihood that there will be research gaps, cr unnecessary duplication. Emergency Response resources constitute another critical area which certainly needs to be increased, but any such increase should be done from a national perspective, based on carefully thought out national priorities. The immense increase in information system inter-networking, the extraordinary growth in the value of our information infrastructure and our Government's dependence upon it for performing critical functions, and the increasingly obvious threats to and vulnerabilities of the NII, all point to the need for a serious review and restructuring of these limited resources. The overall challenge of assuring the health of our national information infrastructure has become too important for it to be addressed by a hodge-podge of committees, councils and working groups, stitched together from the far reaches of the Executive Branch
These two requests, together with closely-related comments, requests and legislative proposals from other Congressional members and committees, amount to an overall demand for the Executive Branch to articulate the NII's vulnerabilities and threats, and to deliver a real plan on what to do about them. So far, no Executive Branch entity has emerged to answer the Congressional mail on this overall issue, and to pull together a cohesive national policy and plan. Given our current Executive Branch structures and resources, it appears unlikely that these Congressional concerns will be satisfactorily resolved anytime soon.
"Fair Court" for contentious information assurance issues Critics point to the facts that: (1) the Board reports to the President through his National Security Advisor; (2) the Board is co-chaired by the DEPSECDEF and the DCI; and (3) the Board's full-time Staff is led by, and heavily populated with, personnel from the defense and intelligence communities.
In addition to the concern about the Board's ability to act as a "Fair Court" in the greater national interest, there is a closely-related, fundamental debate as to whether or not a single entity - any entity, SPB or otherwise - can or should be empowered to ma~e Government INFOSEC policy applicable to information systems processing classified/national security information and unclassified/sensitive information. There are many different arguments to this debate, but they boil down to two opposing views:
LONG TERM: There is a growing body of indications, if not hard evidence, which suggests that the Federal Government may be headed - consciously or not - towards the creation of a department or agency to deal more directly with the myriad issues presented by the emerging NII. If a "Department of Information Resources," or "National Information Infrastructure Agency," or "Federal Information Assurance Commission," or...whatever, along these lines...is in our future, then it would probably be useful to keep such a possibility in mind as we attempt to address current issues within the existing Executive Branch structure.
SHORT TERM: The SPB Staff has identified several options which might be implemented on a reasonably short term basis. They are not mutually exclusive, and simply represent some basic approaches which, if desired, can be further developed
Pluses:
+ Depending on the definitions and boundaries used for "national security," "policy," and "information assurance," this would not be seen as a radical move, and is probably politically doable.
+ It would be in conformance with the language in the draft revision to OMB Circular A-130 restricting the SPB's INFOSEC purview to systems processing national security information.
+ At the SPB level it would give Information Assurance a higher visibility and profile, with more senior membership, than in the current NSTISSC. "Information Assurance" is a broader term than INFOSEC, and such a committee name gets away from the sometimes negative baggage associated with "security," "INFOSEC," "defensive," and "warfare."
+ If appropriate, it could modified or expanded later to address all information assurance, not only for national security systems.
- It would require more staff support than the SPB Staff currently has. It would require at least the level of staff support provided by the NSTISSC Secretariat.
- It would probably impact the future SPB issuance system, to ensure that it is backward compatible with the significant body of NSTISSC, and predecessor organizations, issuances.
- Despite its circumscription to "national security systems," it still may meet with political opposition.
- It would tend to tacitly endorse or approve the view that the "classified" and "unclassified" communities can and should be treated separately for the purposes of information systems security policy. It would simply avoid that basic issue.
(1) the national security community,
(2) the civil government community, and
(3) the private sector.
- Coordinating and consolidating all Executive Branch Information Assurance activities
- Issuing national policies and directives pertaining to Information Assurance
- Proposing and reviewing legislation dealing with or touching upon Information Assurance
- Reviewing Information Assurance budgets, including R&D, throughout the Executive Branch; closely coordinating with OMB and OSTP.
- Preparing and maintaining a Master Plan for Information Assurance activity within the Executive Branch
- Acting as the central point of contact (POC) for the Executive Branch concerning Information Assurance matters; and specifically as the POC for the other branches of the Federal Government.