CHRONOLOGY OF SECURITY ANALYSIS
REPORTS OF DOE, 1980-1999
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR DATA, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGYSep 1979
GAO/EMD-79-109/DOE�s Erroneous Declassification of Nuclear Weapons Design. Los Alamos, sometime between 1971 and 1976 -- while under AEC, incorrectly declassified very sensitive weapons design information, which subsequently was found in publicly accessible library in Los Alamos.
Mar 1980GAO/EMD-80-38/Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and the Problems of Safeguarding Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Improper measuring, storing, and verifying of quantities of nuclear materials.
Sep 1982DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), Sandia National Lab (SNL), and Rocky Flats Plant. Classified findings
May 1984DOE/Office of Safeguards and Quality (OSQ) Assessment: LANL, SNL, LLNL. Classified findings.
Jan 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, Mound Facility. Classified findings.
Feb 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on DOE Germantown and Forrestal Locations. Classified findings.
Jun 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNLL, LLNL, San Francisco Operations Office. Classified findings.
Jan 1986U.S. House of Representatives: Letter of Rep. Dingell letter to the President. Inadequately trained guard force personnel; inadequate protection of classified information; inability to track and recover special nuclear material.
Nov 1986DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on LANL, Albuquerque Area Office. Classified findings.
Apr 1987DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on San Francisco Operations Office and SNLL. Classified findings.
Aug 1987GAO/RCED-87-150/DOE Needs Tighter Controls Over Reprocessing Information. Transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to proliferating nations. DOE funding of research that may involve foreign nationals from countries that have not agreed to Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Jun 1989GAO/RCED-89-116/Nuclear Proliferation: Better Controls Needed Over Weapons-Related Information and Technology. Insufficient control over weapons-related information and technology.
Dec 1990DOE Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Lack of clear and concise physical security standards; inconsistent measurements of nuclear material.
Aug 1991DOE/IG-296/ Department-wide Audit of the Visibility Over the Status of Nuclear Materials. Nuclear materials routinely reported as �in use" or �needed" when they were actually �excess" to any defined requirement.
Dec 1991GAO/RCED-92-39/Nuclear Security Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's Weapons Facilities. Noncompliance with two-person rule for access to nuclear material; physical security personnel unable to demonstrate basic skills.
May 1992DOE/IG/INS-L-92-02/Control of Classified Documents at DOE Savannah River Operations Office. No review of Savannah River classified document controls by DOE Headquarters Office of Security Evaluations Between 1985 and 1990.
Jan 1993DOE/IG-319/ Administration of Conflict of Interest Relating to Tech Transfer at LANL. Conflict of interest by LANL employees, who made decisions, used government resources, and took privileged information to further personal financial interest in spin-off business.
Feb 1993DOE/OSS/ 1992 Annual Report to the Secretary. Aging equipment; lack of adequate system performance testing.
Aug 1994DOE/IG/INS-O-94-05/Inspection of Physical Security Operations at LANL TA-18 Site. LANL not in full compliance with DOE physical security requirements because of LANL's failure to meet deadline for completion of site safeguards and security plan.
Jan 1995DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1994. Numerous deficiencies in marking, accountability, protection, and storage of classified material.
Mar 1995DOE/IG/S941S012/ Albuquerque Vault Classification. Inadequate procedures for protecting combinations to security containers/areas.
Jun 1995DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging security systems.
Jan 1996DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995. Aging security systems.
Sep 1996DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging safeguards and security systems and protective forces; inadequate inventory procedures for some facilities.
Jan 1997DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security for 1996. Classified findings.
Nov 1997DOE/OSA/Report to Secretary on Status of DOE Safeguards and Security Program. Aging physical security systems and protective force.
Jun 1997SNL/Factors Contributing to Current Risk Levels in DOE Complex. Classified finding.
Apr 1999DOE/23rd Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Aging security systems.
Feb 1999GAO/RCED-99-54/Concerns with DOE�s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists. DOE may have provided Russian scientists with dual-use, defense-related information that could negatively affect national security.
PERSONNEL SECURITY Jul 1984
DOE/Ninth Annual Report on Domestic Safeguards. Classified findings.
Jul 1986DOE/IG-228/Retention of Security Clearances at DOE Headquarters. Ineffective procedures for systematically withdrawing clearances after employee termination.
Mar 1987GAO/RCED-87-72/DOE's Reinvestigation of Employees Has Not Been Timely. Personnel security reinvestigations not conducted on timely basis (DOE unable to eliminate case backlog until 1993).
May 1987DOE/IG-238/Selected Aspects of DOE�s Personnel Security Program. Employees granted clearances higher than required; majority of employees not reinvestigated in last 5 years; defective investigative process.
Jun 1987DOE/OSE Inspection Report on Albuquerque Operations Office, LANL. AL and SNL. Lack of procedure to establish eligibility requirement for SCI clearance if family member non-US citizen; lack of timely conduct and analysis of reinvestigations; Albuquerque failure to include security infraction notices in personnel security files.
Dec 1987GAO/RCED-88-28/DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security Clearance Program. Inefficient security clearance program: clearance processing delays; inaccurate clearance data bases; need-to-know problems.
Apr 1988DOE/IG-255/Timeliness in Processing DOE Headquarters Security Clearances. More than 100 days average time for processing applications after necessary forms initially completed; lack of accountability for tracking applications and ensuring timely processing; decisions based on investigative reports not made in timely manner.
Mar 1990DOE/IG/WR-O-90-02/Nevada Operations Office Oversight of Management and Operating Contractor Security Clearances. Four areas employing 928 �Q� cleared employees who had no access to classified material and no clear need to know.
Apr 1990DOE/IG-281/Inspection of LLNL�s Drug-Free Workplace Program. Absence of random drug-testing program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and no original plans to implement program without federal requirement.
Nov 1990DOE/IG/WR-B-91-01/Richland Operations Office of Management and Operating Contractor Personnel Security Clearances. Insufficient number of trained staff in Personnel Security Branch; significant backlog of personnel security clearances awaiting adjudication.
Dec 1990DOE/Safeguards and Security Task Force (Freeze Report). Security clearance processing time exceeds any reasonable standard; OPM delays in investigation not challenged by DOE; resources to implement Personnel Security Assurance Program not provided.
Sep 1991DOE/IG/WR-B-91-08/Review of Contractor�s Personnel Security Clearances at DOE Field Office, Albuquerque. Albuquerque Field Office granted �Q" clearances to 1,058 contractor lab and plant employees who did not need to access classified information.
Dec 1991DOE/IG/WR-V-92-06/Audit of Internal Controls That Assure FY 1991 Costs Claimed by and Reimbursed to LANL Are Allowable Under DOE Contract #W-7405-ENG-36. LANL requested �Q" clearances for more than 500 people not needing access to classified information.
May 1992DOE/IG-310/ General Management Inspection of the Department of Energy�s Nevada Field Office. Defense personnel allowed access to SRD without full background investigation; security clearances reinstated without conduct of required supplemental investigations; individuals designated �holders� for classified documents, without being assigned responsibility for safeguarding documents.
Mar 1993DOE/IG-323/Review of DOE�s Personnel Security Clearance Program. DOE granted security clearances to individuals not specifically requiring access to classified material; processing clear cases averaged 43 working days, 174 calendar days to process derogatory cases.
Aug 1993DOE/IG/S9IJS010/Personnel Security Clearance Suspensions and Revocations at the DOE Albuquerque Field Office, Based Upon Security Infractions/Violations. Deficiencies and inconsistencies in handling of security infractions/incidents by certain national labs and processing of related personnel security actions by Albuquerque.
Aug 1993GAO/RCED-93-183/Nuclear Security: DOE�s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance Workload. Ineffective management by DOE of personnel security cases containing unfavorable information; some DOE contractors not verifying important information on prospective employees.
May 1995DOE/IG/INS-L-95-07/Inspection of LANL-Alleged TA-55 Security Violation. LANL employees who were not personnel security assurance program cleared had been provided access to the material access area at TA-55 site.
Jun 1998DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE�s CI Program. Classified findings.
FOREIGN VISITORS AND ASSIGNMENTS Dec 1986
DOE Special Project Team/Operation Cerberus Report. Scant data available at DOE headquarters on number and scope of foreign nationals at DOE facilities; approval authority for foreign visits and assignments not centralized.
Oct 1988GAO/RCED-89-31/Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories. Failure to obtain timely and adequate information on foreign visitors before allowing them access to labs; lack of enforcement by DOE of internal control mechanisms for approving, monitoring, and reporting foreign visits; no internal review of foreign visitor program; no integrated system to obtain and disseminate foreign visitor information to DOE field offices; inattention to sensitive subjects discussed with foreigners.
Dec 1990DOE Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Security would suffer little if records checks were to be discontinued.
Oct 1993DOE/IG-337/Use of Intelligence Information to Identify the Foreign Interests of Entities Involved with DOE Programs. Failure by DOE to take action to implement provisions of Public Law 102-484 regarding award of certain departmental national security contracts to companies owned by entity controlled by foreign government.
Nov 1996Deputy Secretary of Energy/Curtis Plan. Classified findings.
Sep 1997GAO/RCED-97-229/DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. Less than fully effective procedures for obtaining indices checks on foreign visitors and controlling dissemination of sensitive information. LANL allowed unescorted after-hours access to controlled areas, to preserve �open campus atmosphere.� Lack of clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive subjects. Result: sensitive subjects may have been discussed with foreign nationals without DOE knowledge and approval.
Dec 1997DOE/IG/CR-L-989-02/FMFIA 1997. Large and increasing numbers of foreign nationals visiting labs raised concern about access and potential compromises of classified, sensitive, and proprietary information.
Oct 1998GAO/T-RCED-99-19/Department of Energy: Problems in DOE�s Foreign Visitors Program Persist. As in 1988, visitors with ties to foreign intelligence services gained access to laboratories without DOE and/or laboratory officials' advance knowledge of visitors' connections. As found by GAO in 1988 and 1997, procedures for identifying sensitive subjects lack clear criteria and controls to ensure that visits potentially involving such subjects are reviewed by DOE.
Jun 1998DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE�s CI Program. Classified findings.
Feb 1999DOE/IG/CR-L-99-01/FMFIA 1998. Large and increasing numbers of foreign nationals visiting labs raised concern about access and potential compromises of classified, sensitive, and proprietary information.
INFORMATION SECURITY. Sep 1982
DOE/OSS Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, SNL, and Rocky Flats Plant Classified finding.
May 1984DOE/OSQ Assessment: LANL, SNL, LLNL. Classified findings.
Jan 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Area Office, LANL, Mound Facility. Classified findings.
Feb 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on DOE Germantown and Forrestal locations. Classified findings.
Mar 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Albuquerque Operations Office, SNL. Classified findings.
Jun 1985DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNL and SNLL and San Francisco Operations Office. Classified findings.
Nov 1986DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on LANL, Albuquerque Area Office. Classified findings.
Jan 1987DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on DOE Headquarters. Classified findings.
Apr 1987DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on San Francisco Operations Office and SNLL. Classified findings.
Jun 1987DOE/OSE: Inspection Report on Albuquerque Operations Office, SNL, and LANL. Classified findings.
Apr 1990DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Domestic Safeguards and Security at All Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Classified findings.
Dec 1990Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Inadequate oversight and control over Secret document inventory; responsibility for classified and unclassified computer security split between two DOE organizations, thereby diluting computer security expertise; inadequate professional development programs for computer security specialists.
Feb 1991GAO/RCED-91-65/Nuclear Security: Accountability for Livermore�s Secret Classified Documents Is Inadequate. Inadequate accountability for documents at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) classified; 1990 GAO inventory identified 12,000 missing secret documents. As of January 1991, over 10,000 still missing.
1986; Jul 1991GAO/RCED-91-183/DOE Original Classification Authority Has Been Improperly Delegated. Untitled Information Security Oversight Office report. Improper delegation of original classification authority to contractors, in violation of E.O. 12356, 1982.
Jul 1991DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at All Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Classified findings.
Nov 1992DOE/OSE Annual Report: Safeguards and Security Oversight During Fiscal Year 1992. Lack of adequate guidance; fragmented approach for protecting information.
Feb 1993DOE/OSS/1992 Annual Report to Secretary. Less than satisfactory ratings in classified matter protection and control.
Jan 1994DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993. Inability of DOE to identify its most sensitive information; failure to properly accredit systems processing classified information; lack of controls to provide access authorities and proper password management; no configuration management; improper labeling of magnetic media; failure to perform management reviews.
Apr 1994DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. At LLNL, decentralized computer security management lacked aggressive technical oversight and complete enforcement of critical program elements; computer security program application favors users at expense of security implementation. (U)
Jun 1995DOE/Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Improper accreditation of laptops; data transferred from higher classified systems to lower systems without proper review; inadequate audit trails; improper password controls.
Jan 1996DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995. Lack of management attention to basic information assurance concerns at a time of �increased interconnectivity with relatively uncontrolled entities."
Jan 1997DOE/OSS/Status of.Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1996. Computer system interconnectivity growing exponentially, increasing risk to DOE information assets.
Jun 1998DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE�s CI Program. Classified findings.
1998DOE/IG/198AL001 Improper Export of Software. LANL improperly transferred particular computer software program to PRC and Russia; no criminal violations found, but LANL failed to obtain proper US Department of Commerce license approval.
Nov 1998DOE/OSE/Safeguards and Security Inspection of LANL. Classified findings.
Apr 1999GAO/Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities (April 20, 1999 GAO Congressional testimony). Inadequate separation of classified and unclassified computer networks at LANL in 1988, 1992, and 1994; classified information discovered on LANL unclassified computer network in 1998.
1999DOE/23rd Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities. Numerous incidents of classified information being placed on unclassified systems, including several since the development of a corrective action plan in July 1998.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT. Jun 1985
DOE/OSQ Assessment: Inspection Report on SNLL, LLNL, San Francisco Operations Office. Classified findings.
Jan 1986U.S. House of Representatives: Letter of Rep. Dingell to the President. Misleading system of rating DOE inspections of safeguards and security.
Dec 1986DOE/Special Project Team/Cerberus Report. Lack of adequate short- and long-term planning in DOE's safeguards and security program; insufficient intelligence support for DOE facility security; insufficient standardization of security methods, equipment, and strategies at DOE weapons sites.
Jun 1988DOE Annual Report to the President on Domestic Safeguards and Security. Classified findings.
Oct 1990
Mar 1991GAO/RCED-91-12/Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE Facilities and GAO/RCED-92-39/Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE�s'Weapons Facilities. Inability of DOE to track, monitor, and correct security deficiencies at DOE facilities.
Dec 1990Safeguards and Security Task Force/Freeze Report. Classified findings.
Feb 1991GAO/RCED-91-65/ Nuclear Security: Accountability for Livermore's Secret Classified Documents is Inadequate. Inadequate DOE oversight of LLNL's document control program.
Mar 1991GAO/RCED-91-83/DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify Contractors Having Foreign Interests. Inadequate controls for identifying DOE contractors having foreign interests.
Jun 1992GAO/RCED-92-146/Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE�s Security Program. Lack of system at DOE to oversee and monitor exceptions to DOE safeguards and security orders.
Oct 1992GAO/RCED-93-14/Safeguards and Security Planning at DOE Facilities Incomplete. Incomplete safeguards and security planning at DOE facilities. As of fall 1992, DOE had not completed plans for 15 of its 27 sensitive facilities.
Nov 1992DOE/OSE/Annual Report: Safeguards and Security Oversight During Fiscal Year 1992. Numerous overlapping and confusing safeguards and security inspections; management and oversight problems represent most significant weaknesses in DOE�s security program; inadequate life cycle planning of security systems.
Nov 1992GAO/RCED-93- 10/Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE�s Weapons Facilities. Insufficient DOE validation of corrective actions.
Feb 1993DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security, Report to the Secretary: Status of Safeguards and Security. In Violation of Laws, Losses, and Incidents of Security Concern Program, lack of management focus resulted in personnel seldom being held responsible for disregard of security requirements.
Jan 1994DOE/OSS/Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993. No single office at DOE Headquarters responsible for safeguards and security program; duplication of guidance, unnecessary requests for information, inefficient program execution.
Nov 1996Deputy Secretary of Energy/Curtis Plan. Classified findings.
Sep 1997GAO/RCED-97-229/Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. Failure to provide detailed oversight of the national laboratories' CI programs.
1997DOE/OSA/Report to Secretary on Status of DOE Safeguards and Security Program. Fragmented and dysfunctional security management structure.
Oct 1998GAO/T-RCED-99-19/Department of Energy: Problems in DOE�s Foreign Visitor Program Persist. Failure to evaluate effectiveness of security controls over information in laboratory areas most frequented by foreign visitors.
1998DOD/NCCS Support Staff/DOE Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process. Classified findings.
Jan 1999Special Security Review/Internal Report to the Secretary. Classified findings.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Jun 1990
Classified report.
Apr 1992Classified report.
Apr 1997GAO/RCED-97-128R/Department of Energy: Information on the Distribution of Funds for Counterintelligence Programs and the Resulting Expansion of These Programs. Indirect and inconsistent funding for CI programs; despite additions to overall CI program funds, eight DOE facilities significantly reduced budgetary support for their CI programs.
Apr 1997Classified report.
Sep 1997GAO/RCED-97-229/Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories. DOE CI programs not based on comprehensive assessment of foreign espionage threat.
Jun 1998DOE/OCI/Mapping the Future of DOE's CI Program. Classified findings.
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