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Security Classification of Information: Table of Contents

Chapter 11.


Certain requirements must be met before information can be classified. Those requirements were discussed in earlier chapters. When circumstances change, the classified information may no longer meet all of those requirements, and it should be considered for declassification or downgrading. This chapter describes declassification of information principles. In the following chapter, downgrading classified information is discussed.

Information may be declassified only by certain government employees who have been granted declassification authority.* However, government employees who are responsible for declassification matters frequently ask government-contractor classification personnel to make recommendations as to which classified information should be considered for possible declassification. Therefore, both government classification personnel and government-contractor classification personnel need to be aware of declassification of information principles.

Declassification principles are similar to the previously discussed principles for the original classification of NSI. However, there are some substantive differences with respect to declassifying RD and FRD as compared with the declassification of NSI. Therefore, declassification of atomic energy information (RD and FRD) will be discussed separately from NSI declassification. The declassification of RD and FRD is described in the next section. A later section describes the declassification of NSI.



Declassification of classified atomic energy information (RD and FRD) is of particular interest because it is usually scientific or technical information (the major classification interest in this document) and because of the unique policies and procedures that the United States has directed toward the control of that information.+ The reasons for the stringent statutory control of atomic energy information are difficult to understand without some knowledge of the circumstances under which those controls were first instituted. To facilitate that understanding and because the background information is not readily available elsewhere, this section on the declassification of RD and FRD contains a greater than normal amount of background information.

Control of atomic energy information began in early 1939, when some U.S. physicists first realized that it might be possible to build an atomic bomb. These scientists took an unprecedented (for university scientists) step by voluntarily withholding certain basic scientific information on nuclear fission from publication. Although the first attempt at obtaining wide acceptance of this atomic energy information-control policy was not successful, another effort was initiated in late 1939 and was successfully achieved by mid-1940. This purely voluntary effort to control basic scientific atomic energy information was initiated and implemented by the U.S. scientific community--the U.S. military disclaimed any interest in controlling this information.

From about midyear 1940 until midyear 1942, civilian organizations of the U.S. Government managed the atomic energy program and instituted rigorous controls on atomic energy information. In June 1942, the U.S. Army assumed responsibility for the atomic bomb project (the Manhattan Project) and established additional rigid controls on atomic energy information. The importance of controlling information about atomic bomb development was especially emphasized in a June 29, 1943, letter from President Roosevelt to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratories of the Manhattan Project:

The use of atomic bombs produced by the Manhattan Project was a major factor in ending World War II. The awesome power of those weapons, their sudden and dramatic appearance as weapons of war, the extreme secrecy of the Manhattan Project, and the swift surrender of Japan after their first use made a very strong impression on the U.S. public and Congress. The desire of the public and Congress to maintain a U.S. monopoly on atomic bombs led to the very strict controls on atomic energy information that were included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. That act and its successor Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are the only U.S. statutes ever enacted that classify information.* The provisions of these two atomic energy acts and their legislative history show that U.S. policy is very strongly directed at stringently controlling atomic energy information that can be used for military purposes.

Before discussing declassification of RD and FRD under the currently applicable Atomic Energy Act of 1954, earlier actions declassifying atomic energy information during the Manhattan Project and declassifying RD under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 will be described. Such descriptions will provide a perspective on the policy for the control of atomic energy information in the United States. Additional historical aspects of the declassification of atomic energy information have been discussed elsewhere in some detail.2

Declassification of Atomic Energy Information
Under the Manhattan Project

The terms RD and FRD were not used to identify the Manhattan Project's classified atomic energy information. The term RD was first defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The term FRD was not invented until some time after the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was enacted. "Classified atomic energy information" is used in this section and throughout this document to denote information that could meet the definition of RD or FRD pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The first major declassification of U.S. atomic energy information occurred when an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on August 6, 1945. This explosion revealed that a weapon based on nuclear fission could be produced.* When the fact that something can be done is made public, then other countries can proceed with confidence towards the same goal, knowing that it can be achieved. Thus, a major secret was disclosed when the first atomic bomb was used in warfare.

The second major declassification of atomic energy information occurred when the Smyth Report3 was released to the public on August 11, 1945. This report gave a general account of all U.S. work leading to the production of nuclear weapons. Included in that general account was information that would be very helpful to other nations that wanted to develop nuclear weapons. However, Manhattan Project leaders concluded that the adverse impact of releasing that information was outweighed by several information release benefits. The declassification principles used for that decision are given below. However, two additional reasons for issuing the Smyth Report are of particular interest.4, 5, 6 First, the Smyth Report identified the information that could be discussed as unclassified and thereby helped preserve secrecy on the remaining classified information.+ Second, the Smyth Report provided general information about atomic energy to U.S. citizens to help them reach informed decisions about U.S. atomic energy policy matters.

Several declassification principles guided the preparation of the Smyth Report. For atomic energy information to be included in the Smyth Report, it had to satisfy at least one requirement in each of the following three categories.

I. (A) That it is important to a reasonable understanding of what had been done on the project as a whole or (B) That it is of true scientific interest and likely to be truly helpful to scientific workers in this country and

II. (A) That it is already known generally by competent scientists or (B) That it can be deduced or guessed by competent scientists from what is already known, combined with the knowledge that the project was in the overall successful or

III. (A) That it has no real bearing on the production of atomic bombs or (B) That it could be discovered by a small group (15 of whom not over 5 would be senior men) of competent scientists working in a well-equipped college lab in a year's time or less.7

After the end of World War II, there was much interest within the Manhattan Project in making available, for general scientific and technical use, more of the Manhattan Project atomic energy information. In November 1945 a Committee on Declassification was established by Gen. L. R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, to develop guidelines for declassifying additional atomic energy information. This committee is usually known as the Tolman Committee because physical chemist R. C. Tolman was its chairman. The Committee's first report stated the following as its general philosophy:

In accordance with your [Gen. Groves'] directive the Committee has considered the effect of release of information both on the national welfare and on the national security. In the interest of national welfare it might seem that nearly all information should be released at once. In the interest of national security a superficial consideration of the problem might lead to the conclusion that very little information should be released.

It is not the conviction of the Committee that concealment of scientific information can in any long term contribute to the national security of the United States. It is recognized that at the present time it may be inevitable that the policy of the Government will be to conceal certain information in the interest of national security. Even within this limitation there are many matters whose declassification would greatly help the progress of science without violating that policy. If we are looking to the national welfare or national security as they may be two decades from now the Committee has no doubt that the greatest strength in both fields would come from a completely free and open development of science.

Thus, the Committee is inclined to the view that there are probably good reasons for keeping close control of much scientific information if it is believed that there is a likelihood of war within the next five or ten years. It is also their view, however, that this would weaken us disastrously for the future—perhaps twenty years hence.8

The Tolman Committee used the following positive and negative criteria to guide the declassification of atomic energy information: The Tolman Committee recognized that the need for classification of an item of information would change with time. The following were some reasons for such change:

Three classes (declassification categories) for atomic energy information were established by the Committee:11

For classification guidance purposes, the activities of the Manhattan Project were grouped into six major research and production areas (general, electromagnetic process to enrich uranium, diffusion processes to enrich uranium, plutonium production, nuclear weapon production, and medical information). Project information in each of these six areas was assigned to one of the three declassification categories.

The Tolman Committee's declassification standards for the three classes of atomic energy information can be summarized as follows, arranged from the most stringent to least stringent declassification standard:

The Tolman Committee Report provided the general policies, principles, and detailed guidance for the Manhattan Project's first declassification guide, which was dated March 30, 1946. President Truman made the final decision approving that declassification guide.12

Declassification Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 became effective on January 1, 1947. That act stated the U.S. atomic energy policy to be that the "common defense and security" of the United States was the paramount factor in atomic energy matters.*

This was also mentioned in the act's policy statements to control RD and to declassify RD:

The declassification standard, publication "without adversely affecting the common defense and security," was very rigorous. Further, declassification of RD required the approval of the five AEC Commissioners and therefore such declassification was not procedurally easily accomplished. It is not surprising that relatively little RD was declassified under the 1946 act.

During 1947 the AEC stated that it supported the Manhattan Project's declassification policy as established by the Tolman Committee.15, 16 The AEC's policy on information control was summarized in 1950 as follows [It is perhaps worthy of mention that in 1950 H. D. Smyth was one of the five AEC Commissioners. Dr. Smyth seems to have taken a particular interest in information dissemination and control matters.]:

The AEC's Eighth Semiannual Report stated that the AEC's information control policy was guided by three basic principles:

The principle for controlling information not falling within one of those three categories was, "Will the release of this information help the United States atomic energy program more than it will help the atomic energy program of a potential enemy?"19

Declassification Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 became effective on August 30, 1954, and is currently in effect. That act's definition of RD* was essentially the same as was in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, but a new standard for declassifying RD was established by the 1954 Act:

This "without undue risk" standard replaced the "without adversely affecting" standard of the 1946 act and made it easier to declassify RD. One of the major U.S. policy reasons for the change was to make it easier for some atomic energy information to be applied to civilian (peacetime) uses. Another reason was to enable some atomic energy information to be shared with other nations as part of our foreign policy (e.g., to implement the Atoms for Peace Program).

The 1954 act provided for the transclassification of RD to another category of atomic energy information, later designated as FRD:

The 1954 Act also provided for the declassification of FRD:

Note that the declassification standard for FRD is publication "without unreasonable risk" as compared to the "without undue risk" standard for declassification of RD. Presumably, an undue risk is not as large as an unreasonable risk since RD is more tightly controlled than FRD.* FRD is protected as NSI (except with respect to transmittal to other nations—see above) and therefore declassification standards for FRD would be expected to be similar to those for NSI. However, the declassification standard for FRD, "publication without constituting an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security," is not exactly the same as the NSI declassification standard, which is that disclosures (publication) "reasonably could be expected not to cause damage to the national security" (see below for a discussion of the standard for declassifying NSI).

Much RD and FRD have been declassified under the more liberal declassification standards of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, not much information has been published about the declassification principles and balancing standards used to guide those declassification actions. Some information on those matters is contained in a 1974 AEC report on the AEC classification program.23 That report indicated that the AEC had generally followed the declassification philosophy of the Tolman Committee.23 The report also indicated that the following factors were considered in making recommendations on the declassification of RD and FRD:

Those factors are risks and benefits of information disclosure (see Chapter 6), except for the first factor, which is an information control factor, and the last factor, which is a measure of the extent to which an adversary would be helped by the information disclosure.

The 1974 AEC report also described balancing standards (termed declassification policy statements) to use when declassifying RD and FRD. Five major RD and FRD information areas were listed in that report and a balancing standard (policy statement) was given for each area.23 Those five balancing standards are paraphrased and summarized as follows:

Current DOE policy and standards for declassifying atomic energy information are contained in a 1974 classification policy guide. The basic principle to be used when declassifying atomic energy information was expressed as follows:

Declassification balancing standards were given for several areas of classified atomic energy information. Those standards are paraphrased and summarized as follows:

A 1987 DOE report summarized DOE policy for declassifying atomic energy information. The underlying principle was stated as follows:

That report also stated that when information was considered for possible declassification, the following factors were among those considered:

In 1990 DOE adopted new declassification procedures and stated that proposed declassification actions would be evaluated against the following criteria:

Except for the last two items on this list, the criteria are essentially risks and benefits to be considered when evaluating information for declassification. The last item on the list, which refers to published information, is really an information control matter. The next-to-last item, the cost of developing the information, is a measure of how much the declassification would help an adversary and is therefore not a risk but a factor to be used in evaluating several of the risks. DOE added the following additional criterion to this list in 1992:

Table 11.1 summarizes the risk and benefit criteria that could be used when deciding whether to declassify RD or FRD. That table includes the 1990 and 1992 DOE criteria (expressed specifically in terms of risks and benefits) plus, as benefits, the importance of the information to public discussion and education (stated in the 1987 DOE report), the benefits to U.S. general progress in science and technology (stated in the Tolman Committee Report), and a catch-all "Any other significant benefit to the United States" that was added to be consistent with a similar criterion for determining risks. This table is essentially the same as Table 5.1, except that Table 11.1 is specific for declassifying RD or FRD.

Table 11.1. Criteria that could be used to determine the risks and benefits of disclosure

of scientific or technical information when considering whether to declassify

Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data

Criterion number Description
Criteria for Determining Risks
RC1 The extent to which the information could assist a non-nuclear weapon state in developing a nuclear weapon capability
RC2 The extent to which the information could assist a nuclear weapon state in improving its nuclear weapons
RC3 The extent to which the information could assist in the production of special nuclear material
RC4 The detrimental effects that release of the information could have on U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations
RC5 Any other national security impact or significance (e.g., the extent to which the information would assist other nations in assessing or countering U.S. capabilities and limitations)
RC6 The detrimental effects that declassification of the information could have on the credibility of the Department of Energy classification program
Criteria for Determining Benefits
BC1 The benefits to the progress of the U.S. program that could be achieved from the declassification action
BC2 The benefits to the U.S. program that could be achieved by eliminating the costs of continued classification of the information
BC3 The benefits to the U.S. economy that could be realized by transferring the technology to U.S. industry for commercialization
BC4 The benefits that could be realized by U.S. progress in science and technology, in general, if the information were declassified
BC5 The benefits that release of the information could provide to U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations
BC6 The importance of the information to public discussion and education
BC7 Any other significant benefit to the U.S.
BC8 The benefits that declassification of the information could have on the credibility of the Department of Energy classification program

The complete chronology of the information-control factors, the information-disclosure risks, and the information-disclosure benefits used for declassifying atomic energy information from 1945 to 1992 is summarized in Table 11.2. The last column of that table contains, as proposed comprehensive criteria, the information-control factors discussed in Chapter 4 and the risk and benefit criteria discussed in Chapter 5 and also given in Table 11.1.

The specific standards used by DOE for balancing risks and benefits of declassifying RD and FRD depend upon the area of atomic energy information in which the RD or FRD is included. Those standards were summarized and paraphrased earlier in this chapter. They may be compared with the proposed standards for classifying information that were given in Table 6.2.

RD may be declassified only by the DOE Director of Security Affairs. FRD may be declassified only by a joint determination of the DOE Director of Security Affairs and DoD.28, 29


Declassification Requirements Contained
in Executive Orders

The first two EOs on the classification of information, issued in 1940 and 1950, did not discuss declassifying or downgrading classified information.30 EO 10290, issued in 1951 as the third EO on classification of information, provided for review of classified information (currently termed NSI) for downgrading and declassification and for automatic declassification and downgrading of NSI after a specified event or date.31 Essentially the same declassification and downgrading provisions were included in EO 10501, issued in 1953.32 In 1961, EO 10501 was amended by EO 10964 to require that certain types of NSI be automatically downgraded or declassified at specified time intervals.33 The time intervals were to be measured from the date of issuance of the document containing the classified information. Required automatic downgrading or declassification was specified for some types of NSI in subsequent EOs until EO 12356 was issued in 1982. That EO, which currently governs the classification of NSI, does not require automatic downgrading or declassification of NSI. With respect to declassification and downgrading, EO 12356 states that:

The elimination of automatic downgrading or declassification requirements is recognition of the fact that the security sensitivity of most NSI does not decrease at a fixed rate with respect to elapsed time but is affected by events that cannot be predicted.35, 36 "Gone are the artificial 6- and 20-year limitations that substituted for judgment of original classification authorities."37 The elimination of those requirements is consistent with a 1974 statement by the DoD Director of Research and Engineering: "There can be no magic formula or standard for determining the number of years to retain classification on any particular piece of equipment or item of information."38

O 12065, the immediate predecessor to EO 12356, stated that "declassification of classified information shall be given emphasis comparable to that accorded classified information."39 A comparable directive was not included in EO 12356. EO 12065 also explicitly stated that information which continued to meet all classification requirements might sometimes be declassified when to do so was in the public interest.40 That provision was not included in EO 12356.*

NSI can be declassified by the person originally classifying that information, that person's successor, supervisors of either, or other persons delegated such authority in writing by an agency head or other designated senior agency official.41 Within the DOE and its contractors, NSI can be declassified by the Original Classifier of such information (or successor to that person), the Director of Classification, or the Director of Security Affairs.+, 42

Principles for Declassifying NSI Classified by Executive Order

The basic policy for declassifying NSI, as paraphrased from EO 12356 where the policy is expressed in terms of classifying information, is that NSI can be declassified if its disclosure reasonably could be expected to not cause damage to the national security.++ Table 11.3 compares the declassification policy for NSI with the previously given declassification policies for RD and FRD.

Principles to use when declassifying information are similar to those used for classifying information. Three major steps are involved in classifying information: (1) determining whether the information is under governmental control, (2) evaluating the risks and benefits of information disclosure, and (3) balancing those risks and benefits.

Criteria for determining information-disclosure risks and benefits and the factors for evaluating those criteria were described in Chapter 5 with respect to deciding whether information was classified. Those criteria and factors are also applicable to declassifying information and so they will not be discussed further in this chapter.

Principles and standards to use when balancing information-disclosure risks and benefits were described in Chapter 6 with respect to classification of information decisions. Those principles and standards are also applicable to declassification actions and so they will not be discussed further in this chapter. The standards in Chapter 6 are consistent with the declassification policy given in EO 12356 (see above) when that policy is expressed in terms of net damage to the national security. That is, the classification (declassification) standards of Chapter 6 are consistent with EO 12356 policy when that policy is paraphrased to state that NSI can be declassified when its disclosure reasonably could be expected to not cause net damage to the national security.

The first major step in classifying information (i.e., determining whether the information is under governmental control) has not yet been mentioned in connection with declassification. That is because if the information is currently classified, then it is presumably also currently under governmental control. However, loss of governmental control may provide a reason for declassifying information.

Sometimes classified information that has not yet been declassified will appear in unclassified publications because of unauthorized disclosure, either deliberate or unintentional. In those situations that classified information is no longer totally under government control. A subsection of EO 12356 deals specifically with the publication of classified information.* It states that classified information "shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information."43

DoD guidance specifically mentions the effect of open publication of classified information on declassification considerations:

Courts have held that information in the public domain that is similar to classified information does not warrant the disclosure of the classified information. One court emphasized that the least "bit" of classified information requires protection.45 Another court held that classified information is not to be considered as declassified unless it has been officially disclosed.46 Thus, the appearance of classified information in an unclassified publication does not mean that the information has been declassified. In some situations "the effect of its classification has been lost, but in fact the information is still classified."*, 47

Principles for Declassifying NSI Transclassified from RD

There is reason to believe that the declassification principles mentioned above should not apply to all NSI. There are two kinds of NSI: NSI classified under EO 12356 and NSI transclassified from RD. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes the transclassification of certain RD to NSI:

A similar section of the 1954 act authorized the transclassification of certain RD to FRD (discussed previously in this chapter).

Although FRD is treated like NSI in most respects, the 1954 act specifically requires that FRD be declassified by a joint determination of DOE and DoD, the two entities that also decide if RD can be transclassified to FRD (previously discussed in this chapter). The declassification standard for FRD was also established by the 1954 act (previously discussed in this chapter). That standard (publication without unreasonable risk to the common defense and security) is different than either the standard for RD (publication without undue risk to the common defense and security) or NSI (disclosure reasonably could be expected not to cause damage to the national security).

The unique requirements for declassifying FRD, even though FRD is generally protected like NSI, are consistent with the special concern that Congress has always had for atomic energy information. It is curious that the Atomic Energy Act does not also specify declassification procedures for the RD that has been transclassified to NSI. One might have expected a requirement that the declassification decision be made jointly by DOE and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). One might also expect that the declassification standard for this NSI should be based on the area of atomic energy information from which this NSI was transclassified, since there are different standards for the declassification of RD for the different areas of atomic energy information. Another consideration arises from the probability that the RD transclassified to NSI was probably obtained from intelligence sources and methods. The Director of the CIA is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.49 Does the CIA have a veto power for any decision to declassify NSI that was transclassified to NSI from RD?

There is another unusual aspect to the declassification of transclassified NSI (NSI that was created by transclassifying RD). RD and FRD, once declassified, cannot be reclassified.*, 50 However, under certain circumstances EO 12356 permits declassified NSI to be reclassified.51 Therefore, if the same classification and declassification rules are applicable both to NSI classified under EO 12356 and to NSI transclassified from RD, then NSI transclassified from RD may be declassified and subsequently reclassified. Such an action would be inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act's provision that forbids the reclassification of information that was once RD.50


The criteria for determining the risks and benefits of information disclosure, for use in classification of information decisions, were summarized in Table 5.1 of Chapter 5. The same criteria should be used for determining the risks and benefits of declassifying information. Each risk and benefit must be evaluated to determine its magnitude so that risks can be balanced against benefits. For each risk and benefit there may be several evaluation factors that should be considered. The evaluation factors to use when determining whether information should be classified were summarized in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 of Chapter 5. Those same evaluation factors should be used in determining whether information should be declassified.

Standards to use to balance information-disclosure risks against information-disclosure benefits when making classification decisions were summarized in Table 6.2 of Chapter 6. Those same balancing standards should be used when determining whether information should be declassified.

Matters of proof in declassification decisions are summarized in Table 11.4 for each category of classified information, including the two subcategories of NSI (see above). See Table 6.3 for comparable matters of proof for classification decisions.


1. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer," Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1954, through May 6, 1954, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1954, p. 30.

2. A. S. Quist, Security Classification of Information. Volume 1. Introduction, History, and Adverse Impacts, K/CG-1077/V1, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tennessee, September 1989, Chap. 5. Hereafter cited as "Quist."

3. H. D. Smyth, A General Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes Under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940–1945, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, August 1945.

4. R. G. Hewlett and O. E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 1962, pp. 400, 407. Hereafter cited as "Hewlett and Anderson."

5. L. R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1962, pp. 348–352.

6. V. C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb, United States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1985, pp. 556–562. Hereafter cited as "Jones."

7. Jones, pp. 558–559, quoting from a May 21, 1945, letter from General L. R. Groves to H. D. Smyth.

8. R. C. Tolman, R. F. Bacher, A. H. Compton, E. O. Lawrence, J. R. Oppenheimer, F. H. Spedding, and H. C. Urey, Report of Committee on Declassification, Memorandum to Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves, Nov. 17, 1945, pp. 2–3. Hereafter cited as "Tolman Report."

9. Tolman Report, p. 3.

10. Tolman Report, p. 4.

11. Tolman Report, pp. 4-5.

12. Hewlett and Anderson, p. 647.

13. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, §10(a); 60 Stat. 766.

14. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, §10(b)(1); 60 Stat. 766.

15. B. J. Bok, F. Friedman, and V. Weisskopf, "Security Regulations in the Field of Nuclear Research," Bull. At. Sci, 3, 321–324, 344 (November 1947), p. 321. This article included the contents of a letter dated Aug. 27, 1947, from C. L. Wilson, General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, to B. J. Bok, which described the Commission's policy on atomic energy information security.

16. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Second Semiannual Report, July 1947, p. 15.

17. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Seventh Semiannual Report, January 1950, pp. 169–170.

18. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Eighth Semiannual Report, July 1950, pp. 227–228. Hereafter cited as "Eighth Semiannual Report."

19. Eighth Semiannual Report, p. 228.

20. 42 U.S.C. §2162(a).

21. 42 U.S.C. §2162(d).

22. 42 U.S.C. §2162(c).

23. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., internal document, 1974.

24. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., internal document, 1974.

25. U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., internal document, 1987.

26. Memorandum from J. C. Tuck, DOE Under Secretary of Energy, to DOE Operations Office Managers, "Department of Energy Declassification Procedures," Tab 1, May 1, 1990.

27. Letter from A. B. Siebert, Director, DOE Office of Classification, to Distribution, Revised Evaluation Criteria for Proposed Declassification Actions, Attachment 2 to "Revised Department of Energy Declassification Procedures," March 12, 1992.

28. U.S. Department of Energy, DOE Order 5650.2B, "Identification of Classified Information," Chap. VI, Part A, §1.a, Dec. 31, 1991. Hereafter cited as "DOE Order 5650.2B."

29. 42 U.S.C. §2162(c).

30. See Quist, Chap. 3, for a more detailed discussion of EOs governing the classification of information.

31. Executive Order 10290, Fed. Reg. 16, 9795 (Sept. 27, 1951), §28.

32. Executive Order 10501, Fed. Reg., 18, 7049 (Nov. 10, 1953), §4.

33. Executive Order 10964, Fed. Reg., 26, 8932 (Sept. 22, 1961).

34. Executive Order 12356, Fed. Reg., 47, 14874 (Apr. 6, 1982), §1.4(a). Hereafter cited as EO 12356.

35. E. Hill, "Defence Procurement and Classification in the U.K.," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc., 16, 20–27 (1980), p. 25.

36. A. P. Stringer, "Classification Management in the United Kingdom," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc., 23, 38–43 (1987), p. 43.

37. A. F. Van Cook, "Information Security and Technology Transfer (An OUSD Overview of Executive Order 12356 and DoD's View Concerning Implementation)," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc., 18, 1–7 (1982), p. 3.

38. J. S. Foster, Jr., in Government Secrecy, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 22, 23, 29, 30, 31 and June 10, 1974, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1974, p. 268.

39. Executive Order 12065, Fed. Reg., 43, 28949 (July 3, 1978), §3-301. Hereafter cited as "EO 12065."

40. EO 12065, §3-303.

41. EO 12356, §3.1(b).

42. DOE Order 5650.2B, Chap. VI, Part A, §1(b).

43. EO 12356, §1.3(d).

44. U.S. Department of Defense, Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R, Chap. II, §2-209, June 1986.

45. Abbotts v. NRD, 766 F.2d 604, 607-608 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

46. Simmons v. United States Department of Justice, 796 F.2d 709 (4th Cir., July 31, 1986).

47. J. F. Doherty, "Classification in the Federal Government," J. Natl. Class. Mgmt. Soc., 3(2), 97–105 (1967), p. 104.

48. 42 U.S.C. §2162(e).

49. 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3); National Security Act of 1947, §102(d)(3).

50. 42 U.S.C. §2166.

51. EO 12356, §1.6(c).

On to Chapter Twelve.

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