Federal Register: April 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 71)
Proposed Rules
Page 17886-17890
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
10 CFR Part 709
[Docket No. CN-03-RM-01]
RIN 1992-AA33
Office of Counterintelligence; Polygraph Examination Regulations
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public
comment.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) publishes a
notice of proposed rulemaking to begin a proceeding to consider whether
to retain or modify its current Polygraph Examination Regulations. DOE
is undertaking this action, among other reasons, to satisfy the
directive of section 3152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 that following issuance of the National Academy of
Sciences' Polygraph Review (NAS Polygraph Review), DOE is to prescribe
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program, whose
Congressionally-specified purpose is "* * * to minimize the potential
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or
information."
DATES: Written comments (10 copies) are due June 13, 2003.
ADDRESSES: You may choose to address written comments to U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Counterintelligence (CN-1), Docket No.
CN-03-RM-01, 1000 Independence Avenue. SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Alternatively, you may e-mail your comments to: poly@hq.doe.gov. You
may review or copy the public comments DOE has received in Docket No.
CN-03-RM-01 and any other docket material DOE makes available at the
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. This notice of proposed rulemaking
and supporting documentation is available on DOE's internet home page
at the following address: http://www.energy.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Hinckley, U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Counterintelligence, CN-1, 1000 Independence Avenue,
SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Lise Howe, U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of General Counsel, GC-
[[Page 17887]]
73, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-
2906.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
Under section 3152(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (NDAA for FY 2002), DOE is obligated to prescribe
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program the stated
purpose of which is "* * * to minimize the potential for release or
disclosure of classified data, materials, or information" (42 U.S.C.
7383h-1(a).) Section 3152(b) requires DOE to "* * * take into account
the results of the Polygraph Review," which is defined by section
3152(e) to mean "* * * the review of the Committee to Review the
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of
Sciences" (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(b), (e)).
Upon promulgation of final regulations under section 3152, and
"effective 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional
defense committees the Secretary's certification that the final rule *
* * has been fully implemented, * * *" section 3154 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA for FY 2000) (42
U.S.C. 7383h), would be repealed by operation of law. (42 U.S.C. 7383h-
1(c).) The repeal of section 3154 would eliminate the existing
authority which underlies DOE's counterintelligence polygraph
regulations, which are codified at 10 CFR part 709, but would not
preclude the retention of some or all of those regulations through this
rulemaking pursuant to the later-enacted section 3152 of the NDAA for
FY 2002.
In Part II of this Supplementary Information, DOE reviews
background information useful in understanding the existing statutory
and regulatory provisions applicable to DOE's current
counterintelligence polygraph examination program. In Part III of this
Supplementary Information, DOE discusses its preliminary views with
regard to the relevant factual and policy issues, including DOE's
evaluation of the NAS Polygraph Review which is entitled "The
Polygraph and Lie Detection." That discussion explains why the
Secretary of Energy has approved today's preliminary proposal to retain
the regulations in 10 CFR part 709 as a balanced approach for the
carefully circumscribed use of polygraph examinations as a tool that
appears in current circumstances well-suited to accomplish the
Congressionally-specified purpose "* * * to minimize the potential for
release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information"
(42 U.S.C. 7383h-1).
DOE invites interested members of the public to provide their views
on the issues in this rulemaking by filing written comments. With an
open mind, DOE intends carefully to evaluate the public comments
received in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking. DOE will
then consider whether to issue a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking with additional policy options for public comment and
whether it is necessary and timely to hold a public hearing to provide
an opportunity for presentation of oral comments.
II. Background
Consistent with section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000, DOE published
a notice of final rulemaking establishing 10 CFR part 709 on December
17, 1999 (64 FR 70975). The provisions of 10 CFR part 709 list the
types of employees and positions that are subject to polygraph
examinations. Under 10 CFR 709.4, the polygraph program applies to all
DOE employees and contractor employees, applicants for employment, and
other individuals assigned or detailed to positions in eight categories
which are discussed in detail in part III of this Supplementary
Information. Employees may request exculpatory polygraph examinations
to deal with unresolved counterintelligence or personnel security
issues. Part 709 also describes the polygraph examination protocols DOE
uses, the policies for safeguarding the privacy rights of employees,
and the requirements that apply to ensure well qualified and well
trained polygraph examiners.
After DOE promulgated 10 CFR part 709, Congress amended section
3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000 by section 3135 in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106-398). Section 3135
amended the earlier definition of "covered persons" contained in
section 3154 to include assignees, detailees and applicants. The
definition of "high risk program" was revised to include programs
using information known as Sensitive Compartmented Information, SAP,
PSAP, PAP, and any other program or position category specified in
section 709.4(a) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 3135
amended section 3154(f) to add the terms "terrorism" after
"sabotage" and "deliberate damage to or malicious misuse of a United
States Government information or defense system" to the statutory
definition of the scope of a counterintelligence polygraph examination.
Section 3135 also amended section 3154 by adding language that limited
the Secretary's authority to waive the examination requirement.
III. DOE's Proposal To Implement Section 3152(a) of the NDAA for FY
2002
The focal point for analysis of the factual information and policy
considerations relevant to this rulemaking is the Congressionally
stated purpose of the counterintelligence polygraph regulations which
is "* * * to minimize the potential for release or disclosure of
classified data, material, or information" (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(a)).
Given the nature of this directive--as a statement of the purpose of
the program, not as a standard that the program must meet--DOE does not
construe this directive as a mandate mechanistically to construct a
program that takes all steps to protect classified data, materials, or
information, no matter what the countervailing considerations.
Construing the directive in that fashion could lead to absurd results,
potentially requiring DOE to expend so much of its resources on
polygraphs and associated provisions that the program would
significantly detract from DOE's ability to accomplish its national
security mission. At the same time, however, DOE does believe that the
directive signals a Congressional hierarchy in the weighing of various
considerations, pursuant to which DOE must take potential jeopardy of
classified data, materials, or information very seriously in
considering the potential consequences that may flow from how it
constructs its program. DOE has evaluated the question whether to
retain or modify the list of positions currently set forth in its
regulations as subject to polygraph examinations over a five-year
period against this Congressionally-stated purpose so construed.
As noted above, that list is set forth at 10 CFR 709.4. It
includes: "(1) Positions that DOE has determined include
counterintelligence activities or access to counterintelligence sources
and methods; (2) positions that DOE has determined include intelligence
activities or access to intelligence sources and methods; (3) positions
requiring access to information that is protected within a non-
intelligence special access program (SAP) designated by the Secretary
of Energy; (4) positions that are subject to the Personnel Security
Assurance Program (PSAP); (5) positions that are subject to the
Personnel Assurance program (PAP); (6) positions that DOE has
determined have a need-to-know or access to information specifically
designated by the Secretary
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regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons and associated
use control features; (7) positions within the Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, or any successor thereto, involved
in inspection and assessment of safeguards and security functions,
including cyber security, of the Department; (8) positions within the
Office of Security and Emergency Operations, or any successor thereto *
* *" This list reflects, but is not restricted to, the positions
listed in section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000. Consistent with section
3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE proposes to retain these eight
position categories because in each category there are individuals who
possess or have routine access to classified data, material, or
information that would likely be targeted for acquisition by foreign
powers. DOE has not reached a firm conclusion that all the position
categories on the list should be retained, or that all should be
retained in their current form, but it believes that a sufficient basis
for their retention exists that it is not prepared to propose the
modification or removal of any at this time. DOE accordingly
particularly invites comment on the question whether the list, or any
of the position categories on the list, is overinclusive or
underinclusive, and if so, how and on what basis the list, or any of
the position categories on the list, should be modified.
The list of position categories in 10 CFR 709.4(a) also includes
two categories of individuals who volunteer for polygraph examinations.
There is a category of applicants for employment who opt for the
Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) (10 CFR 709.4(a)(9)).
These applicants choose to be polygraphed in order to obtain expedited
interim "Q" clearances pending completion of field investigations.
There is also a category composed of incumbent employees who volunteer
for so-called exculpatory polygraph examinations to resolve questions
that have arisen in the context of counterintelligence investigations
or personnel security issues (10 CFR 709.4(a)(10).
The NAS Polygraph Review examined the scientific evidence with
regard to the validity of polygraph examinations used for the screening
of applicants for employment and incumbent employees, as well as for
specific-event investigations (which include what DOE calls
"exculpatory polygraph examinations"). The NAS pointed out that the
available scientific evidence is generally of low quality and consisted
of 57 studies of which 53 are specific-event investigations and four
are flawed studies of employee screening. While noting that the
available empirical research has not established the underlying factors
that produce the physiological responses observed during polygraph
examinations, and that generalizing from such responses in research
settings to real world settings is hazardous, the NAS nevertheless
concluded that "* * * specific-incident polygraph tests discriminate
lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below
perfection * * *" (NAS Polygraph Review at p. 3). DOE is inclined to
accept this conclusion with regard to exculpatory polygraph
examinations under 10 CFR 709.4(a)(10), but given the limitations of
the tool, DOE does not treat the results of such examinations as
conclusive as to truthfulness or mendacity. Accordingly, DOE may follow
up an exculpatory polygraph result with additional investigative
activities if DOE considers that action appropriate. DOE does not now
contemplate any change in this policy.
With regard to polygraph examinations for employee screening under
10 CFR part 709, the NAS takes a significantly different view. Against
the background of what it acknowledges is very sparse evidence, the NAS
is dubious about both the validity and the advisability of such
examinations.
Validity. According to the NAS, the proportion of the employee
population at DOE that poses a major national security threat
(presumably including threats to classified information) is extremely
low. In the NAS's view, screening in a population with a very low rate
of target transgressions will necessarily yield, as a function of how
sensitively the polygraph test is set, either a large number of false
positives or a large of false negatives (NAS Polygraph Review at 4, 2-4
through 2-7, 2-20 though 2-21, and 7-2 through 7-4). On that basis, the
NAS concludes that polygraph examinations are too inaccurate to be used
for employee screening. (NAS Polygraph Review, p.4.)
In reaching its negative conclusion, the NAS acknowledged that a
screening polygraph, even if set to reduce the number of false
positives, will identify true positives who are being deceptive.
Accordingly, DOE does not believe that the issues that the NAS has
raised about the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a
decision by DOE to abandon it as a screening tool. Doing so would mean
that DOE would be giving up a tool that, while far from perfect, will
help identify some individuals who should not be given access to
classified data, materials, or information. DOE does not believe
wholesale abandonment of a tool that has some admitted value for that
purpose can be squared with Congress's overall direction to implement a
polygraph program whose purpose is " * * * to minimize the potential
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or
information."
Advisability. The NAS's main conclusion is that lack of evidence of
validity and accuracy justifies not using polygraph examinations for
screening purposes. In arriving at this conclusion, the NAS also took
into account the expense associated with invalid polygraph results, the
potential loss of competent or highly skilled individuals due to false
positives or the fear of such a test result, and claims of adverse
impact on civil liberties. The NAS also acknowledged but considered
less significant the deterrent effect that the prospect of being
polygraphed could have on employment applicants who are national
security risks. In short, what NAS conducted was a cost-benefit
analysis that (given the nature of the costs and benefits) inevitably
rested in no small part on value judgments made by the NAS. There is
nothing inappropriate about this approach in light of the NAS's mission
and charge.
DOE, however, has a significantly different mission--one that is
intimately involved in science, but directed to a particular end--the
national security of the United States; therefore, not surprisingly,
section 3152 gave the Department a particular charge for its polygraph
program. That charge was not to devise a program based on the NAS's or
the Department's own weighing of costs and benefits based on its own
value judgments. Rather, Congress directed DOE to develop a polygraph
program focused on minimizing the risk of release or disclosure of
classified information. That amounts to a Congressional specification
that the most important cost about which DOE should be concerned is the
risk of release or disclosure of classified information. DOE believes
that Congress's judgment in that regard was reasonable. Given that
DOE's classified information consists in significant measure of
information regarding nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the
consequences of compromise of that information can be profoundly
significant. Those consequences make it sensible for Congress to
conclude that DOE's priority should be on deterrence and detection of
potential security risks with a secondary priority of mitigating the
consequences of false positives and false negatives. Moreover, whatever
may be the importance of other
[[Page 17889]]
considerations, DOE believes that at this time, when the United States
is engaged in hostilities precisely in order to address the potentially
disastrous consequences that may flow from weapons of mass destruction
falling into the wrong hands, it is under a particular obligation to
make sure that no action that it takes be susceptible to
misinterpretation as a relaxation of controls over information
concerning these kinds of weapons. For all these reasons, while fully
respecting the questions the NAS has raised about the use of polygraphs
as a screening tool, DOE does not believe it can endorse the NAS's
conclusion that the tool should be laid down.
Perhaps in recognition that its main conclusion was less tenable in
the context of Federal agencies with national security missions
established by law, the NAS went on to conclude in the alternative that
if polygraph screening is to be used at all, it should only be used as
a trigger for follow-up detailed investigations and not as a sole basis
for personnel action (NAS Polygraph Review, p. 5). This alternative
conclusion appears to DOE to be much more compatible with the priority
DOE is statutorily invited to place on minimizing the potential for
release or disclosure of classified information. It is also consistent
with the way DOE currently uses screening polygraphs.
Under DOE's current regulations, neither DOE nor its contractors
may take an adverse personnel action against an individual solely on
the basis of a polygraph result indicating deception (10 CFR 709.25).
If, after an initial polygraph examination, there are remaining
unresolved issues, DOE must advise the individual and provide an
opportunity for the individual to undergo an additional polygraph
examination. If the additional polygraph examination is not sufficient
to resolve the matter, DOE must undertake a comprehensive investigation
using the polygraph examination as an investigative lead (10 CFR
709.15(b)). In DOE's view, this regulatory scheme is consistent both
with the NAS's alternative conclusion and with the statutory priority
on minimizing release or disclosure of classified information.
Therefore, pursuant to section 3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE today
proposes on a preliminary basis to retain the regulatory provisions in
part 709. DOE invites public comment on its evaluation of the NAS
Polygraph Review with regard to employee screening and on its
assessment that the existing provisions of part 709 are consistent with
the NAS's alternative conclusion.
IV. Regulatory Review
A. National Environmental Policy Act
The proposed rule would retain the existing procedures for
counterintelligence evaluations to include polygraph examinations and
therefore will have no impact on the environment. DOE has determined
that this rule is covered under the Categorical Exclusion in DOE's
National Environmental Policy Act regulations in paragraph A.5 of
appendix A to subpart D, 10 CFR part 1021, which applies to rulemakings
amending an existing regulation that does not change the environmental
effect of the regulations being amended. Accordingly, neither an
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is
required.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, requires
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for every
rule that must be proposed for public comment, unless the agency
certifies that the rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This
rulemaking will not directly regulate small businesses or small
governmental entities. It will apply principally to individuals who are
employees of, or applicants for employment by, some of DOE's prime
contractors, which are large businesses. There may be some affected
small businesses that are subcontractors, but the rule will not impose
unallowable costs. Accordingly, DOE certifies that the proposed rule,
if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act
DOE has determined that this proposed rule does not contain any new
or amended record-keeping, reporting or application requirements, or
any other type of information collection requirements that require the
approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. The OMB has defined
the term "information" to exclude certifications, consents, and
acknowledgments that entail only minimal burden [5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1)].
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.,
requires a Federal agency to perform a detailed assessment of the costs
and benefits of any rule imposing a Federal mandate with costs to
state, local, or tribal governments, or to the private sector of $100
million or more. The proposed rule does not impose a Federal mandate
requiring preparation of an assessment under the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995.
E. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999
Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1999, (Pub. L. No. 105-277), requires Federal agencies to issue
a Family Policymaking Assessment for any proposed rule that may affect
family well being. This proposed rule will not have any impact on the
autonomy or integrity of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE
has concluded that it is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking
Assessment.
F. Executive Order 12866
Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993) provides for a
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the
Office of Management and Budget of a "significant regulatory action,"
which is defined as an action that may have an effect on the economy of
$100 million or more or adversely affect the economy, competition,
jobs, productivity, environment, public health or safety, or state,
local or tribal governments. DOE has concluded that this proposed rule
(10 CFR Part 709) is not a significant regulatory action. Accordingly,
this rulemaking has not been reviewed by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs.
G. Executive Order 12988
Section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, 61 FR 4729 (February 7,
1996) imposes on executive agencies the general duty to adhere to the
following requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity;
(2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear
legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, and
promote simplification and burden reduction. Section 3(b) of Executive
Order 12988 specifically requires that executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies
the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on
existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard
for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden
reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately
defines key terms; and (6) addresses
[[Page 17890]]
other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Section 3(c) of
Executive Order 12988 requires executive agencies to review regulations
in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to
determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or
more of them. DOE has completed the required review and determined
that, to the extent permitted by law, this proposed rule meets the
relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.
H. Executive Order 13084
Under Executive Order 13084, 63 FR 27655 (May 19, 1998), DOE may
not issue a discretionary rule that significantly or uniquely affects
Indian tribal governments and imposes substantial direct compliance
costs. This proposed rulemaking would not have such effects.
Accordingly, Executive Order 13084 does not apply to this rulemaking.
I. Executive Order 13132
Executive Order 13132, 64 FR 43255 (August 10, 1999), requires
agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure meaningful and
timely input by state and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have "federalism implications." Policies
that have federalism implications are defined in the Executive Order to
include regulations that have "substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government." On March 14, 2000, DOE published a
statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation
process it will follow in the development of such regulations (65 FR
13735). DOE has examined this proposed rule and determined that it
would not have a substantial direct effect on the states, on the
relationship between the national government and the states, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. No further action is required by the Executive Order.
J. Review Under Executive Order 13211
Executive Order 13211 (Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy, Supply, Distribution, or Use), 66 FR 28355
(May 22, 2001) requires preparation and submission to OMB of a
Statement of Energy Effects for significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866 that are likely to have a significant adverse
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This rulemaking,
although significant, will not have such an effect. Consequently, DOE
has concluded that there is no need for a Statement of Energy Effects.
K. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999
The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44
U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for agencies to review most disseminations
of information to the public under guidelines established by each
agency pursuant to general guidelines issues by OMB. OMB's guidelines
were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2001), and DOE's guidelines
were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). DOE has reviewed this
notice of proposed rulemaking under the OMB and DOE guidelines, and has
concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those
guidelines.
V. Opportunity for Public Comment
Interested members of the public are invited to participate in this
proceeding by submitting data, views, or comments on this proposed
rule. Ten copies of written comments should be submitted to the address
indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this notice. Comments should be
identified on the outside of the envelope and on the comments
themselves with the designation "Polygraph Examination Regulation,
Docket No. CN-03-RM-01." If anyone wishing to provide written comments
is unable to provide ten copies, alternative arrangements can be made
in advance with the DOE. All comments received on or before the date
specified at the beginning of this notice, and other relevant
information before final action is taken on the proposed rule, will be
considered.
All submitted comments will be available for public inspection as
part of the administrative record on file for this rulemaking in the
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room at the address indicated in the
ADDRESSES section of this notice. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR
1004.11, anyone submitting information or data that he or she believes
to be confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should
submit one complete copy of the document, as well as two copies, if
possible, from which the information has been deleted. The DOE will
make its determination as to the confidentiality of the information and
treat it accordingly.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 709
Lie detector tests, Privacy.
Issued in Washington, DC on April 8, 2003.
Stephen W. Dillard,
Director, Office of Counterintelligence.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE hereby proposes to
amend 10 CFR part 709 to read as follows:
PART 709--POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGULATIONS
1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 709 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., 7101, et seq., 7383h-1.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 03-9009 Filed 4-11-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
Federal Register: April 18, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 75) Proposed Rules Page 19166 ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Office of Counterintelligence 10 CFR Part 709 [Docket No. CN-03-RM-01] RIN 1992-AA33 Polygraph Examination Regulations; Correction AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public comment; correction. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This document corrects the preamble to a proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register of April 14, 2003, regarding Polygraph Examination Regulations. This correction revises the web address where you may access this notice of proposed rulemaking and other supporting documentation. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Hinckley, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Counterintelligence, CN-1, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Lise Howe, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of General Counsel, GC-73, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-2906. Correction In proposed rule FR Doc. 03-9009, appearing on page 17886, in the issue of Monday, April 14, 2003, the following correction should be made: In the ADDRESSES section, the last sentence is corrected to the following: This notice of proposed rulemaking and supporting documentation is available on DOE's Internet Home Page at the following address: www.so.doe.gov. Issued in Washington, DC on April 14, 2003. Stephen W. Dillard, Director, Office of Counterintelligence. [FR Doc. 03-9631 Filed 4-17-03; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P